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MR. JUSTICE BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW, AND THE
TALISMAN OF STATE ACTION
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*

They also serve who only stand and wait.t
I

JN RECENT YEARS the Supreme Court has been greatly agitated over the significance of a single word. That word is state.
It appears just once in those compact clauses which provide:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.1
In those cases whi~h ordinarily occasion an examination of the
word, it may initially be supposed that a person may have been deprived of due process or denied equal protection. Before embarking
upon the usual sorting, weighing and balancing of interests under
the appropriate rubric of due process or equal protection, however,
the Court has frequently found it necessary first to determine
whether there is any occasion for such an elaborate and arduous
undertaking. If it is clear that the alleged deprivation of due process or the claimed denial of equal protection cannot fairly be imputed to a state, for instance, there would seem to be no point whatever in pursuing the matter any further. After all, even the least
sophisticated student appreciates the fact that the fourteenth amendment does not grant or establish anything as a legal right; it merely
provides a limited immunity against state divestiture of certain pre• A.B. 1955, University of Southern California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University.
Professor of Law, Duke University. Senior Fellow, Yale Law School, 1964·65.
t Milton, Sonnet on His Blindness.
~ U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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rogatives which all persons may claim as human beings. 2 Private
interferences with those prerogatives, like acts of God, presumably
raise no problems under the fourteenth amendment. If a man is on
his way to address a meeting in a public park, for instance, the fourteenth amendment apparently is no more involved when he is
stopped by a private citizen who keeps him from the meeting than it
would have been had he been detained by a sudden rainstorm. Since
it would be futile for the Court to weigh the social value of rainstorms against the value of a person's freedom of speech in order to
determine whether there has been an abstract unconstitutional
abridgment, it has ordinarily seemed equally foolish to undertake a
weighing of interests in cases where private action alone has intervened to frustrate a person's protected prerogatives. Thus, the initial
issue in cases arising under the fourteenth amendment traditionally
has been whether there was some reviewable state involvement in the
acts of those who allegedly abridged the constitutionally protected
interest in question.
A classical treatment of this traditional approach is Black v.
Cutter Labs.8 In that case, a private employee was discharged by
a private employer because of her membership in the Communist
Party. The discharge was pursuant to a private collective bargaining contract which provided that such membership would
constitute "just cause" for discharge. The discharge was upheld
by the California Supreme Court. The employee's petition for
certiorari was dismissed by a majority of the Supreme Court on
the ground that "the decision involves only California's construction
of a local contract under local law and therefore no substantial federal question is presented."4 The Court did not decide on the
2 See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 326 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Bouie v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 365 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Griffin v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 130, 138 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146,
151-52 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715, 722 (1961) (dictum); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 658 (1951) (dictum);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (dictum); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323,
330 (1926); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 298 (1920) (dictum); Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906) (dictum); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)
(dictum); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638-40 (1882): Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (dictum); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554·55 (1875)
(dictum)•
• 351 u.s. 292 (1956).
'!d. at 299. (Emphasis added.)
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merits that the particular employer's business interests as weighed
against the employee's circumstances and interests made the employer's decision constitutional because it was reasonable. So far
as the majority was concerned, the reasonableness of the employer's
decision was not reviewable because of the fact that no state involvement beyond orderly protection of that decision was present;
absent some other state action, there was nothing to review. The
employer, not the State of California, had fired the employee,
and if due process had been denied, it had been denied by the employer and not by California.
A recent and exceptionally vigorous restatement of this common
sense approach is provided by Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion
in Bell v. Maryland.G There, twelve Negro students had been convicted of trespass after refusing to leave a restaurant when requested
to do so by the manager, who was acting on orders given by one
Hooper, the president of the corporation which owned the restaurant. Whether Hooper's decision to refuse service and exclude the
Negroes was reasonable under all the circumstances, i.e.) whether the
corporation's interest in freedom of action, its business risks,· its
employees' associational preferences, etc., were of sufficient importance to rationalize whatever injury was done to the interests of the
Negroes by their being denied service, was never discussed by Mr.
Justice Black. It would supposedly have been a waste of time for
him to make such an inquiry if the exclusionary decision could not
have been reasonably imputed to the state. Absent some significant
involvement of the state, this "private" denial of equal protection
would no more have raised a constitutional issue under the fourteenth amendment than had lightning arbitrarily struck the Negroes
just before they entered the restaurant.
Accordingly, in keeping with sensible orthodoxy and the logical
order for reviewing the issues, Mr. Justice Black began his opinion
by noting that the equal protection clause could be brought into
play only after a determination that the state, in this case Maryland,
had made the decision to exclude the Negroes:
• 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964). For the fate of the majority's treatment of the case, see
Bell v. State, 204 A.2d 54 (Md. 1964). The Court will not be confronted with the
case again, however, because of its decision in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S.
306 (1964).
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This section of the Amendment, unlike other sections,a is a pro·
hibition against certain conduct only when done by a State-'state
action' as it has come to be known-and 'erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.' 7
He then pointed out that the facts clearly established that Maryland
did not attempt to influence the owner's decision to refuse service
to Negroes:
There is no Maryland law, no municipal ordinance, and no official
proclamation or action of any kind that shows the slightest state
coercion of, or encouragement to, Hooper to bar Negroes from his
restaurant.s
Mr. Justice Black might also have added that there was no governmental subsidy, leasehold connection or delegation of governmental
functions which could identify Maryland as the necessary "real"
• At this point, Mr. Justice Black inserted the following footnote: "E.g., § 5 (of the
fourteenth amendment]: 'The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.'" I d. at 326. In several other places in his
opinion, Mr. Justice Black further adverted to the power of Congress to extend the
coverage of equal protection to private acts of discrimination. See, e.g., id. at 329,
335, 339, 343. Is Mr. Justice Black ·prepared to uphold federal legislation bottomed
on § 5 of the fourteenth amendment and directed against discrimination in all places
of public accommodation, not merely against those affecting interstate commerce or
involving orthodox state action? While he has expressly declined to commit himself,
id. at 343, I believe that he is.
Support for such an exercise of congressional authority can be found in FAIRMAN,
MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME CoURT 1862-1890 190-93 (1939); HARRIS, THE
QUEST FOR EQUAUTY (1960); MAGRATII, MORRISON·R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARAC·
TER 116·34 (1963); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection
of the Laws," 50 CoLuM. L. REv. 131 (1950); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); Hale,
Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by
Private Individuals, 6 LAw. GUILD REv. 627 (1946); Peters, Civil Rights and State NonAction, 34 NoTRE DAME LAw. 303 (1959); Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. Car. L. REv. 103, 107-12 (1963). Significant case law on point includes
Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); Ex parte Riggins, 134
Fed. 404, 409 (N.D. Ala. 1904); United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. 1324 (No. 15210)
(C.C.D. Del. 1873); United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81·82 (No. 15282) (C.C.S.D.
Ala. 1871).
The possible significance of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment should also be
examined in view of Dean Griswold's analysis of § 2 of the fifteenth amendment.
Hearings on S. 480, S. 2750, and S. 2979 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 138·53 (1962).
Also of considerable relevance are GEllHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS clJ. 9 (1960); PEKELIS,
Private Governments and the Federal Constitution, in LAw AND SociAL AcnoN 91
(1950); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543, 559
(1954).
7
378 U.S. at 326.
'I d. at 333.
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author of the decision to exclude the Negroes.9 In any case Mr.
Justice Black was on solid footing when he held that the exclusionary
decision could not be imputed to Maryland, and since Hooper, not
Maryland, had refused service to the Negroes, there could be no
basis for proceeding further into the case. Arbitrary or not, invidious or not, capricious and unassociated with any compelling
proprietary interest or not, Hooper's action was simply unaffected
by anything in the fourteenth amendment.
Finally, Mr. Justice Black directed his attention to the only
visible connection between Maryland and Hooper, namely, the
executive and judicial application of the state's nondiscriminatory
trespass statute which safeguarded Hooper's decision. Mr. Justice
Black quickly eliminated that connection as sufficient to impute the
restaurateur's decision to Maryland:
To avert personal feuds and violent brawls [our society] ... has led
its people to believe and expect that wrongs against them will be
vindicated in the courts. Instead of attempting to take the law
into their own hands, people have been taught to call for police
protection to protect their rights wherever possible.... None of
our past cases justifies reading the Fourteenth Amendment in a
way that might well penalize citizens who are law-abiding enough
to call upon the law and its officers for protection instead of using
their own physical strength or dangerous weapons to preserve
their rights.10
The point seems eminently well taken. No reasonable person
would contend that Maryland's even-handed willingness to apply its
trespass statute to protect or vindicate Hooper made his decision to
exclude Negroes the decision of Maryland. Maryland enforced the
decision, but it clearly did not make the decision.
In view of all of this, it was forebearing of Mr. Justice Black to
have refrained from ridiculing his three brothers who went on to
balance the interests and scrutinize the fairness of Hooper's conduct
• Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th
Cir. 1960). See also Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Pennsylvania
v, Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
10 378 U.S. at 327-28.
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almost as though the fourteenth amendment applied to Hooper
himself, and not merely to Maryland. Evidently these straying
Justices bypassed the threshold prerequisite of "state action" which
is necessary to legitimate that further inquiry. Evidently they ignored the language and limitations of the fourteenth amendment
which the Court has often restated:
The provisions of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution we
have quoted all have reference to State action exclusively, and not
to any action of private individuals.11
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
of the amendment.l2
[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of
the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.1a
[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to
the Equal Protection Clause ... ,14
II
It is true, of course, that three of these celebrated quotations are
taken from cases in which they were dicta, cases where the Court in
fact found reviewable state action, proceeded to the merits, and
applied the fourteenth amendment in behalf of equal protection
claims. It is likewise true that the fourth case, the Civil Rights
CasesP involved the constitutionality of a federal statute under
section five of the fourteenth amendment. There the Court actually
presumed that the states did not enforce or protect a conflicting proprietary claim.16 No matter. The dicta are firmly based on the
clear language of the fourteenth amendment. They were bound to
be applied when put to a proper test as in Bell and Cutter Labs.
Nevertheless, while Mr. Justice Black's analysis in Bell is clearly
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
18 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
u Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). See also other
cases cited in note 2 supra.
lG 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
,. "[H]is rights .. may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State
for redress. An individual ... may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of
the right in a particular case [but] ••. he will only render himself amenable to sa tis·
faction or punishment; and amenable therefore to the Jaws of the State where the
wrongful acts are committed." ld. at 17.
11
12
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the same type of analysis as that implicit in the brief majority treatment of Cutter Labs., Mr. Justice Black actually joined in a dissenting opinion in the latter case. Even more strange is the fact
that that dissent turned on a weighing and balancing of the rival
interests of the private litigants. The dissenters did not draw up
short of a treatment of the merits, even though they knew perfectly
well that it had been the owners of Cutter Laboratories rather than
the State of California who had fired the petitioner. To the contrary, they briefly reviewed the petitioner's interest in freedom of
political association, they noted the absence of evidence suggesting
that Cutter Laboratories had some legitimate reason for dispensing
with her services, and they would have applied the due process clause
to bar the employer's discharge decision from taking effect. Moreover, in refusing to boggle over the state action prerequisite, the
dissent in Cutter Labs. expressly relied on Shelley v. Kraemei17 as
precedent.18 Since Mr. Justice Black had voted with a unanimous
Court in Shelley, it is not surprising that he would approve of its
citation in the Cutter Labs. dissent. The surprise is, rather, that
Shelley itself held a state responsible for denying equal protection in
the mere application of a common law rule which safeguarded a
private covenantee's own current easement in real property. Shelley
held that certain privately acquired, bargained-for property rights of
private citizens could not be enforced by any state, when such enforcement would frustrate a purchaser's interest in acquiring and
holding the affected property without disqualification because of
race or color.19 The Court in Shelley did not, as it assuredly could
not, impute to the state the particular willingness of Kraemer to
bargain away an i~cident of ownership in return for an identical
easement against co-covenantors. As in Bell, "no [state] ... law, no
municipal ordinance, and no official proclamation or action of any
kind [showed] ... the slightest state coercion of, or encouragement
to," 20 the private decision-makers in Shelley. Rather, it was merely
"in granting judicial enforcement"21 to a wholly private decision to
334 u.s. 1 (1948).
351 U.S. at 302-03.
1 ° Compare Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 328·31 (1964) (Mr. Justice Black's dis·
cussion of Shelley) witlz Brief for Petitioners, pp. 51·57, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,
379 u.s. 306 (1964).
2o 378 U.S. at 333.
2 1 334 U.S. at 20.
17

18
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withhold private property from prospective Negro purchasers that
the state became involved. It was never in doubt that the racial
animus and the decision to discriminate were supplied solely by
private parties who were neither coerced nor encouraged by the state.
So private citizen Kraemer, not Missouri, decided that faithless
covenantor Ferguson should be bound by his agreement and that
Shelley should be kept from home ownership because of his race.
Private corporation Cutter Laboratories, not California, decided
that its employee should be fired because of her political affiliation.
What else, if anything, tends to detract from the crystalline correctness of Mr. Justice Black's analysis in Bell?
In Illinois at one time, private employers were free to forbid
organizational picketing of their shops when there was no existing
dispute between the employer and his own employees. No em~
ployer was required to forbid such picketing, however, and Illinois
did not coerce or encourage any employer's decision in any way. If
a given employer wished to permit such picketing, he was at liberty
to do so Gust as he was free to hire Communists or serve Negroes).
On the other hand, if he decided not to allow picketing, he could
secure an injunction in order to protect his decision. The situation
in Illinois regarding picketing was therefore analogous to the trespass
situation in Maryland in the very same respect that Mr. Justice
Black found to be of critical importance in Bell: any given shop
owner's decision to impair an interest allegedly protected by the
fourteenth amendment would have been solely the decision of a
private party. Since the decision of such an employer could not
honorably have been imputed to Illinois, which had neither encouraged nor coerced his decision, the fourteenth amendment evidently could not have been involved in a case arising from the
state's protection of that decision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
should have dismissed any appeal taken by pickets who had been
enjoined from refusing to honor an employer's decision to bar
them from picketing in front of his private shop. Certainly there
would seem to have been no occasion to waste time by considering
the pickets' due process claim on the merits; no matter how
unreasonable the employer's decision might have been or how substantial the interests of the pickets, the case would seem to have
been no more reviewable than had a cruel and arbitrary plague,
rather than the employer, intervened to halt the picketing. Private
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decisions and plagues, as we have noted, evidently raise no fourteenth amendment issues.
Curiously, however, seven members of the Supreme Court did
not reach this result in AFL v. Swing,22 decided in 1941. Instead,
they briefly assessed the competing interests of the employers and
union organizers, concluded that the union's interest in peaceful
and non-defamatory picketing outweighed the needs of the employers to be free of such harassment, applied the due process clause,
and reversed the judgment below. Mr. Justice Black concurred.
The case was cited and relied upon with Mr. Justice Black's approval in Shelley 23 in 1948, and, as previously noted, Shelley in turn
was relied upon by the dissent in Cutter Labs. 24 in 1956, again with
Mr. Justice Black's approval.
Perhaps, however, the surface inconsistency of these cases does
not detract from the soundness of Mr. Justice Black's 1964 opinion
in Bell where he dealt so differently with the prerequisite of state
action. Or perhaps he has simply altered his position for the better,
with the correct approach being that taken by him in Bell. In each
case, to be sure, something desired by some persons was denied or
taken away at the instance of other private persons who lacked any
collateral tie with the state and whose decisions were neither en~
couraged nor coerced by the state. Perhaps Mr. Justice Black would
now feel that such actions as those of Kraemer, Swing, and Cutter
Laboratories would fail to raise a substantial federal question.25
There is still another, more recent case, however, which is also
difficult to square with the relentless logic of prerequisite state action
developed by Mr. Justice Black in Bell. That case is New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan. 26
In Alabama, as in most states, private citizens enjoy a certain
•• 312 u.s. 321 (1941).
334 U.S. at 17.
•• See note 18 supra.
•• Of course the Swing case permits an easy orthodox distinction because the picketing occurred on a public sidewalk rather than inside Swing's shop. See, e.g., Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 295 (1940); Hague v.
CIO. 307 U.S. 495 (1939). But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354
U.S. 284 (1957); Giboney v. Empire Storage &: Ice Co., 335 U.S. 490 (1949).
Nevertheless, note where the protected speech occurred in Gamer v. Louisiana, 368
U.S. 157, 185, 196-204 (1961) (concurring opinion); Marsh v. Alabama, 325 U.S. 501
(1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Compare Commonwealth v. Davis,
162 Mass. 570, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) .
•• 376 u.s. 254 (1954).
01
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right to be free from defamatory utterances which they find offensive.
These citizens are neither encouraged nor coerced by the state to
refuse to consent to such treatment, however, or to invoke the state's
libel laws upon being defamed without advance consent. As a matter
of fact, a resident of Alabama is every bit as free to permit other persons to impugn his reputation as a storekeeper in Maryland is to permit Negroes to remain in his restaurant. Alabama does nothing
more to encourage its residents to do anything about libellants, than
Maryland does to encourage its restaurateurs to exclude Negroes. In
this respect, Alabama also takes the same disinterested position with
respect to libel as Missouri did in Shelley regarding Negroes; Missouri covenantees were free to allow Negroes to live next door, just
as Alabama libellees are free to allow other persons to defame them.
In each case, the individual alone decides whether adequate protection of his own best interests requires that some law, such as the
common law of libel, property, or trespass, be applied in a manner
which necessarily subordinates the conflicting interests of others.
When the New York Times defamed Mr. Sullivan in Alabama,
and Mr. Sullivan-like Mr. Kraemer of Missouri and Mr. Swing of
Illinois in their cases-decided freely to discipline the Times through
"a civil lawsuit between private parties,"27 it should have surprised
no one that the Alabama Supreme Court declined to consider any
argument of the defendant based upon the fourteenth amendment. 28
The decision to punish the Times and to discourage its editors from
future assaults on his reputation obviously was made solely by
Sullivan, not by Alabama. Had the Alabama Supreme Court been
able to anticipate Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Bell, it might usefully
have adopted part of his opinion in this sort of paraphrase:
There is no Alabama law, no municipal ordinance, and no official
proclamation or action of any kind that shows the slightest state
coercion of, or encouragement to, Sullivan to discipline the New
York Times for reflecting adversely upon his reputation. 29
Then, directing its attention to the only visible connection between
Alabama and Sullivan, viz., the judicial application of the state's
common law rule against libel, the Alabama court might quickly
-----·------~-----------·--·--~

- -

ld.at265.
•• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 676, 144 So. 2d 25, 40 (1962), rev'd,
376 u.s. 254 (1964).
•• See text accompanying note 8 supra.
27
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have eliminated that connection as sufficient to impute Sullivan's
decision to Alabama by paraphrasing another passage of Mr. Justice
Black's opinion in Bell:
To avert personal feuds and violent brawls our society has led its
people to believe and expect that wrongs against them will be
vindicated in the courts. Instead of attempting to take the law
into their own hands, people have been taught to seek the protection o£ the courts wherever possible. None of our past cases
justifies reading the fourteenth amendment in a way that might
well penalize citizens who are law-abiding enough to call upon the
law instead of using their own physical strength or dangerous
weapons to preserve their rights.so
That approach certainly would have been just as applicable in the
New York Times case as it was in Bell. The fourteenth amendment
should not have been interpreted in a manner which would have encouraged Sullivan to seek private vengeance against those who
libelled him rather than turn to the courts for vindication of his
reputational rights in an orderly fashion.
Although the Alabama Supreme Court did not have the benefit
of this wisdom, it nevertheless made the proper finding according to
the orthodoxy of Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Bell. It noted that
"the Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not
private action." 31 And the facts clearly established that Sullivan's
decision not to consent to the Times' libel and to invoke the
protection of the state courts could not be imputed to Alabama.
Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment in favor of Sullivan without
embarking upon a lengthy balancing of Sullivan's interests in reputational integrity against the Times' interests in publication. Such a
balancing operation seemingly would have served no useful purpose.
In withholding consent from the Times and suing for damages
under Alabama law, Sullivan may have deprived the Times of freedom of speech, but Sullivan, of course, is not subject to the fourteenth amendment!
The Supreme Court of the United States viewed the case somewhat differently. In a single terse paragraph, which, incidentally,
cited the Swing case, the Court declared that Alabama rather than
Sullivan had acted in a manner allegedly depriving the Times of
80

81

See text accompanying note 10 supra.
273 Ala. at 676, 144 So. 2d at 40.
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freedom of speech. 32 It then proceeded to weigh the competing
interests of the parties at considerable length, and concluded that
consistent with substantive due process, the New York Times could
not be barred from publishing the type of statement which Sullivan
found objectionable. Consequently, it reversed the judgment in
favor of Sullivan on constitutional grounds. Mr. Justice Black not
only concurred in the decision, but wanted to provide even more
fourteenth amendment protection than that provided by the majority.33 The New York Times decision came down just three
months before Mr. Justice Black dissented in Bell for want of sufficient state action to reach the merits.

III
No doubt certain distinctions lend themselves to a rationalization
of the cases discussed above. Many such distinctions have been suggested in the vast periodical literature which has been fascinated
u "The first (ground asserted to insulate the judgment of the Alabama courts from
constitutional scrutiny] is the proposition relied on by the State Supreme Court-that
'The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not private action.'
That proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and
that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. • • • TI1e test is not the
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such
power has in fact been exercised." 376 U.S. at 265.
Note that it was enough that a common law rule was applied to mediate con•
flicting claims of right "between private parties.'' The Court did not find reviewable
state action by relying upon the fact that the plaintiff was a state official (a police
commissioner), or that the state could be described as seeking to suppress criticism
of itself to the extent that it granted damages for libel directed to the official conduct
of one of its own functionaries. It is significant that the Court did not take this easy
means of isolating the reviewable element of state action. Had it done so, the Court
would have left itself open to difficulty in extending the holding of the case to
protect non-malicious libel directed against candidates for office, who are not state
officials and whose criticized conduct could not possibly be attributed to the state.
The case is almost certain to afford such protection, since the rationale was stated in
terms of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," and the need for "breathing
space" and protest regarding "major public issues," even when such debate and
protest contains carelessly made false statements injurious to others. 376 U.S. at
270-83. See also Kalven, The New York Times Case: "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 191; Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and The
Law of Libel: The Modem Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964). A rule
insisting that negligent defamation of an incumbent directed to his official conduct is
constitutionally protected. but that negligent defamation of his opponent regarding his
qualifications for office is not equally protected, would be an unthinkable warping of
fair political comment. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
83
376 U.S. at293.
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with the state action conundrum.34 None of these distinctions, however, ultimately serves to excuse Mr. Justice Black's unique failure
to examine the fundamental fairness of the Maryland trespass law
as applied in Bell. For there was in that case, as there is in every
case where conflicting claims of right are mediated by state law, sufficient state involvement to bring the case within the threshold of
constitutional review. And if the trespass convictions in Bell were
u In addition to the materials cited in note 6 supra, see Abernathy, Expansion of
the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 375
(1958); Alfange, "Under Color of Law": Classic and Screws Revisited, 47 CoRNELL L.Q.
395 (1962); Barnett, What is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution1 24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945); Berle,
Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from
Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952); Carl, Reflections
on the "Sit-Ins," 46 CORNELL L.Q. 444 (1961); Gilbert, Theories of State Action as
Applied to the "Sit-In" Cases, 17 ARK. L. REv. 147 (1963); Hale, Force and the State:
A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 149
(1935); Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-In: Evolving Property Concepts, 44 B.U.L. REv. 435
(1964); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
473 (1962); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 637 (1961); Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1964); Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208
(1957); Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REv. 555
(1951); Karst & Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State Action-Mr. justice Douglas,
Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REv. 762 (1962); Lewis, The Role of Law in Regulating
Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 402 (1964);
Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 101; Lewis, Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1458
(1961); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Cowr.r. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Manning,
Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular
Reservations, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 38 (1960); Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 203 (1949); Paulsen,
The Sit-In Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 137;
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal
Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315; Rice, Sit-Ins: Proceed with Caution,
29 Mo. L. REv. 39 (1964); St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look
at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicH L. REv.
993 (1961); Schwelb, The Sit-In Demonstration: Criminal Trespass or Constitutional
Right1, 36 N.Y.UL. REv. 779 (1961); Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic
Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3
(1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv.
1 (1959); Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action,"
70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347
(1963); Comment, A Statement Against State Action, 37 So. CAL L. REv. 463 (1964);
Comment, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on the State Action Concept, 44 CALIF. L.
REv. 718 (1956); Comment, Lunch Counter Demonstrations: State Action and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 VA. L. REv. 105 (1961); Comment, Constitutional LawEqual Protection-Racial Discrimination and the Role of the State, 59 MicH. L. REv.
1054 (1961); Note, State Action, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956); Note, Applicability of
the Fourteenth Amendment to Private Organizations, 61 HARV. L. REv. 344 (1948).
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reconcilable with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, it could only have been because the state's mediation of
the conflicting claims of right was sufficiently reasonable under the
circumstances. It could not have been because the reasonableness
of the scheme was not reviewable by the Court for lack of requisite
state action, as Mr. Justice Black thought.
The action to be reviewed in a fourteenth amendment case does
not, of course, inhere in the decision of a private citizen to deny
something to others when that decision meets with the acquiescence
of those whom it adversely affects. If the matter is carried no
further than that, there is-by definition-no clash of interests which
the state is called upon to mediate and no case or controversy to be
carried to the Supreme Court for review. Such would have been the
case in Bell had Hooper's decision not to serve Negroes been
unopposed by the contention of the Negroes involved that they were
entitled to service. Reviewable state action does inhere, however, in
the manifestly public act explicit in every state decision to deny
something which persons claim as a matter of right, as when Negroes
maintain that they are entitled to enter into certain commercial
transactions as a matter of right, regardless of race and regardless of
a seller's feeling about race. And whether the state's decision to
deny the claimed right is based upon some state policy which seeks
to protect interests of the state, or upon some state policy which
seeks to protect purely private interests opposed to the asserted claim
of right, it equally involves a policy of the state. In every case, the
state policy is permissible under the fourteenth amendment only if
it is consistent with standards of due process and equal protection.
Accordingly, the Court cannot avoid an inquiry into the reasonable·
ness of the manner in which the state has classified competing private
interests, some of which it has preferred and established as "rights,"
and others of which it has subordinated.
So the decision to be reviewed for constitutional reasonableness
in fourteenth amendment cases is solely the decision of the state,
manifest in the law which is employed by the state to mediate the
conflicting claims (or decisions, if you like) of private parties. The
decision to be reviewed in such cases is the decision-in-law of the
state to establish one freedom and disestablish another, and the issue
is whether that decision-in-law is fundamentally reasonable, i.e.1
whether it classifies and treats the interests with which it is con-
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cemed, preferring some and subordinating others, in a fashion con•
sistent with due process and equal protection.
The issue in Bell was not whether Hooper acted in an arbitrary
fashion from a point of view which takes into consideration only his
interests, but whether Maryland was arbitrary in its classification of
the "rights" of property owners and the "duties" of customers under
the circumstances, i.e., whether the state was arbitrary in its dis·
positive point of view with respect to the interests of all the parties.
The issue in Swing was not whether Swing's wish to be free of pickets
was unreasonable from his point of view, but whether Illinois was
unreasonable in defining the "rights" of shopkeepers and the
"duties" of union organizers in a manner which made Swing's point
of view count for everything and the union interests count for
nothing. The issue in Cutter Labs. was not whether Cutter acted
unreasonably when it decided to fire one of its employees because of
her political affiliation, but whether California had a sufficient reason
under the circumstances for its decision to prefer the business
interests of employers over the conflicting interests of employees in
the manner provided for in its law of contracts. The issue in Shelley
was not whether the Kraemers' antagonism regarding Negro neigh·
bors was unreasonable from their point of view, but whether Missouri's law respecting enforceable covenants was reasonable under
the circumstances, taking into consideration the points of view of
the prospective Negro purchaser and the willing seller.35 And fi.
nally, of course, the issue in the New York Times case was not
whether Sullivan should have "permitted" the Tim-es to impugn
his official conduct, but whether Alabama's law of libel unreasonably
protected reputational interests at the expense of free speech. The
issue in such cases as these, in short, is the constitutionality of oper·
ative governmental policies, manifest in laws which mediate conflicting personal claims of right.
Before a case involving conflicting claims of right reaches the
Supreme Court under the fourteenth amendment, it will have been
tentatively resolved according to some state law. That law will have
been utilized to determine "whose conduct is entitled to the 'law's
protection' " 36 as between two or more human beings whose conflicting interests and proposed decisions and conduct are mutually
•• See Van Alstyne &: Karst, supra note 34 at 44-49.
•• 378 U.S. at 312. See also Paulsen, supra note 34 at 164.
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exclusive under the circumstances. Whatever answer that law has
propounded, it will be final only if the value preferences implicit
in the answer are within the range of choices open to the state under
the fourteenth amendment, i.e., only if the state's operative policy
is consistent with due process and equal protection. In order to
pass upon that consistency, the Court must necessarily review the
reasonableness of the state's policy as applied through the law which
was used to decide whose conduct is entitled to protection. This,
of course, is precisely the approach in which Mr. Justice Black has
repeatedly concurred in such cases as Swing, Shelley, Cutter Labs.,
and New York Times.
A further review of the Swing case may make the matter clearer.
The State of Illinois has classified people in a tremendous variety of
ways, according to many different tests and for many different purposes. It not only has established broad legal categories or classifications, e.g., "buyers" and "sellers," it also has established operative
classifications further refining these categories, e.g., "sellers of securities" and "buyers of stolen goods.'' Whether each such classification
and the concomitant recognition of rights, privileges, duties, powers
and immunities which attach to membership in it are constitutional,
depends in each case upon the fundamental reasonableness of the
classification. Whether each given classification is fundamentally
reasonable depends, in turn, on a variety of considerations which the
Supreme Court usually regards as relevant. The relevance of these
considerations, moreover, does not depend upon any connection
which the state may have with either party other than through the
law which fixes their operative rights and duties. In the Swing case,
for instance, the Court might have assessed the state's apportionment
of "rights" and "duties" between shopkeepers and union organizers
in terms of these typical questions:
(1) What policies within the legitimate concern of the state are served in
its current treatment of conflicting employer and union interests?
(2) How is the particular grouping of legal interests explicit in Illinois'
allocation of rights and duties respecting picketing related to those
policies?
(3) What is the character and extent of adversity endured by those subject to the particular duty imposed by this law?
(4) What alternative means, if any, are available to the state adequately
to protect certain employer interests which it should be free to protect
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without, however, hampering union interests to the extent inherent
in the present scheme?
(5) To what extent do considerations of federalism, the special character
of the problem, or other matters oblige the Court to refrain from
substituting its judgment for that of the state legislature, or from
reaching the merits?

Once these and perhaps other considerations were taken into consideration in reviewing the reasonableness of the Illinois law, the
Court was in a position to arrive at its decision. Conversely, had
these considerations not been raised and resolved, no reasonable
decision would have been possible.
The breadth of the decision in a given case may vary, of course,
again depending on a number of considerations which are always a
part of the judicial process. For instance, the decision may be· a
narrow one if the Court perceives distinctions in the case which
would not have equal significance if certain facts were altered. It
may also be narrow if the case being reviewed is relatively novel and
the Court is reluctant to foreclose consideration of related cases
which it cannot clearly anticipate. On the other hand, the decision
may be broad to the extent that the Court is concerned with its
workload and reluctant to entertain a series of line-drawing sequels
to the case at hand, or to the extent that a broader rule would better
serve the educative function of the Court or better advise legislators
who cannot be expected to master the minutiae of finely drawn distinctions. Technically, the decision may be, as it was in Swing,
merely to reverse the state supreme court's affirmance of an injunction. In so doing, however, the Court in Swing held the Illinois
law which authorized that injunction unconstitutional as applied.
Thus, as a matter of stare decisis, the case stands for the proposition
that no state may impose a duty upon persons to refrain from peaceful and nondefamatory organizational picketing at the request of an
employer, even in the absence of a controversy between that employer and his mrn employees. What was it that was reviewed and
found wanting under the fourteenth amendment in the Swing
case? It was a law and a policy of Illinois, nothing more and nothing
less.
But what of the reason advanced by Mr. Justice Black in Bell
for not wanting to review the law of Maryland in the same fashion?
Shouldn't the Court have upheld the Illinois law in Swing in order
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to refrain from penalizing "citizens who are law-abiding enough to
call upon the law and its officers for protection instead of using
their own physical strength or dangerous weapons to preserve their
rights"? 37 Wasn't it likely that Swing would attempt to disperse the
pickets himself, after learning that the state could not protect his
"rights"? Perhaps it was, but it would have begged the whole question for the Court to rely upon the apprehension of such conduct
as a reason to uphold the law. It would also have assumed that the
Court must condone unconstitutional injustice in one case for want
of authority to prevent violence in some other case, even though it
has not been shown that: (a) such violence is likely to occur; (b) the
Court would lack means of correcting the violence if it did occur;
or (c) the threat of violence in some other case is a sufficient reason
to deny a constitutional right in the case at hand.
The first of these propositions could not safely be assumed in
either Swing or Bell. The third proposition has been flatly contradicted by the Court's unanimous position in the violent aftermath of
Brown v. Board of Education.38 The second proposition indulges a
presumption which is probably false; any subsequent outbreak of
violence is very likely to result in another case which will once again
permit the Court to review the manner in which the state has mediated conflicting personal claims of right.
Assume, for instance, that after the Swing case, Illinois had revamped its law so as no longer to authorize injunctions on behalf of
employers who have requested union organizers to refrain from
picketing their shops. Instead, suppose it had enacted a new statute
merely recognizing an employer's "privilege" to use any force necessary in order to remove pickets from in front of his business establishment and denying the "right" to recover damages to any picket
injured under such circumstances. Assume further that a case
subsequently had arisen in whic~ an employer had inflicted personal
injuries upon a picket in order to discourage him from picketing,
378 U.S. at 328.
349 u.s. 294 (1955).
"[C]onstitutional rights, .. are not to be sacrificed •Jr yielded to. violence and
disorder
" Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1. 16 (1958).
"[I]mportant as is the preservation of the public peace, this a1m cannot be accom·
plished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal
Constitution." Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).
See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
327 n.9 (1951) (dissenting opinion); Hague v. CIO, 307 V S. 496 (1939).
81
88
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the picket had sued for damages in a state court, the court had dismissed the action in accordance with the revised Illinois law, and
the state supreme court had affirmed per curiam. The plaintiff
would have applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, alleging that the Illinois "employer-privilege" statute had
deprived him of substantive due process and denied him the equal
protection of the laws. What would have been the result? Would
the state statute in question have been less arbitrary than the one
which preceded it? Clearly it would have been more arbitrary, for
the state could no longer have urged that its law was based in part
on a policy of avoiding violence in labor disputes-a policy which
arguably tended to make its original law somewhat more reasonable.
If anything, this case would have been easier than the Swing case;
the statute would have been doomed. But that is not really the
point. The point is, rather, that when the Court applied the fourteenth amendment in the Swing case to invalidate the state's common
law rule providing for injunctive protection of employers, it did not
in the least imply that a different scheme, even more invitive of
violence, would pass constitutional muster.
Precisely the same observations can be made with respect to Bell.
In striking down the Maryland trespass statute as applied in that
case, the Court most certainly would not have authorized the state.to
apply some other law, even more arbitrary in its classification of
"ownership rights" and "customer duties," to protect Hooper.
Mr. Justice Black's principal analytical shortcoming in Bell was
his unexamined assumption that the trespass statute in question was
bottomed on a reasonable classification of rival proprietary and
customer interests. He assumed that it was reasonable for the state
to protect the discriminatory prerogatives of corporate restaurateurs
and to subordinate the prerogatives of those who seek commercial
services. Given that assumption, of course, it followed that the
trespass convictions should be affirmed. At no point, however, did
Mr. Justice Black address himself to the question which his assumption bypassed: was the state's classification of those claimed p~eroga
tives reasonable under the circumstances?39
88 The nearest that Mr. Justice Black comes to addressing himself to this question
is his statement that "the Amendment does not forbid a State to prosecute for crimes
committed against a person or his property, however prejudiced or narrow the victim's
views may be.'' 378 U.S. at 327. However, this response is itself grounded on
challengeable assumptions. The initial assumption is either (a) that the property
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Had the Court held the Maryland trespass statute unconstitu·
tional as applied, it necessarily would have done so because the state's
classification of "incidents of ownership" and "customer duties,"
manifest in its trespass law, was arbitrary under the circumstances.
In making such a determination, the Court would have addressed
itself to a series of questions similar to those which were advanced
earlier as possibly present in the Court's analysis of the Swing case.
Thus, the issues which Mr. Justice Black should have discussed in
Bell are these:
(I) What policies within the legitimate concern of the state are manifest
in the state's trespass law which mediates conflicting proprietary and
customer interests?
(2) How is the trespass law's allocation of rights and duties respecting
service in places of public accommodation related to those policies?
(3) What is the character and degree of hardship which must be endured
by those persons who are subject to the duties imposed by the law?
(4) What alternative means, if any, are available to the state adequately
to protect legitimate proprietary interests without, however, subordinating legitimate customer interests to the extent inherent in the
present scheme?
(5) To what extent do considerations of federalism, the special character
of the problem, practical limitations on the Court's power, or other
matters, oblige the Court to refrain from subordinating state policies
to those of the fourteenth amendment on this occasion?
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion recognized the duty of the Court
to confront these questions, and it resolved them against Maryland. 40
"belongs" to the owner in accordance with principles found elsewhere than in the
law of the state, and hence not within the purview of the fourteenth amendment, or
(b) that the state is adhering to due process and equal protection when it grants an
absolutely enforceable, exclusionary privilege to absentee corporate "owners," and
treats conflicting interests which are asserted as "criminal." lVith respect to (a), see
BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111·13 (Ogden ed. 1931); Hecht, supra note 34.
With respect to (b), see Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 196-204 (1961) (concurring
opinion); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940); Berle, supra note 34; Manning, supra note 34.
Moreover, the latter part of Mr. Justice Black's statement appears to imply that the
owner in such a case is merely being protected by the state in order to safeguard his
right to hold a personal prejudice rather than to protect some impersonal business
calculation, and that the state is merely protecting the owner's right to hold such a
"view" rather than his attempt to assert that view through discriminatory action.
As to the nature of the belief allegedly protected by the state, see 378 U.S. at 245·46,
271-78 (opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas). With regard to whether the state in such
cases is protecting a prejudiced belief or discriminatory action, compare Bell with
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) and Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
•• 378 l·.S. at 311·12. Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion is outlined here in order to
demonstrate how he resolved the questions appropriate!} raised b) the equal protection
claim. and not to sugge~t that a different resolution would have been unreasonable.
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According to Mr. Justice Goldberg, the limitations imposed on state
power by the equal protection clause dictate that no state may subordinate customer interests in commercial service to proprietary
interests in refusing to deal when
(a) the establishment where such service is sought is generally open to the
public at large;
(b) the service is of an impersonal, casual, and occasional nature;
(c) the owners or managers who seek to refuse service are not personally
involved in rendering that service;
(d) the service sought would contribute to the material comfort and wellbeing of those interested in it;
(e) those seeking service are wholly unobjectionable other than because
of their race or color; and
(f) the proprietary interests involved are unlikely to suffer from competition by similar establishments, in which customer interests in service
must be equally respected.41
In passing upon the constitutional acceptability of the Maryland
trespass statute, Mr. Justice Goldberg was necessarily concerned with
the claimed prerogatives of private proprietors and those of private
customers. He would have been derelict not to be so concerned, for
the fairness of the manner in which those competing personal claims
of right were tentatively mediated by the State of Maryland, through
its trespass statute, could not possibly have been determined absent
an assessment of the claims of right themselves. Whether the trespass statute constituted an unreasonable limitation of customer prerogatives manifestly could not have been determined without evaluating the respective interests of the parties, meaning the parties
whose conduct was affected by the trespass statute.42 In precisely the
His historical arguments, for instance, are far from conclusive. 378 U.S. at 288-311.
Compare Mr. Justice Black's opinion in this regard. Id. at 335-41. See also Paulsen,
supra note 34, at 151-58.
n 378 U.S. at 312-15.
'"See Traynor, supra note 34, at 238. See also Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring):
Judicial enforcement is of course state action, but this is not the end of the
inquiry. The ultimate substantive question is whether there has been 'State
action of a particular character' •..-whether the character of the State's involvment in an arbitrary discrimination is such that it should be held responsible
for the discrimination.
This limitation on the scope of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment serves several vital functions in our system. Underlying the cases
involving an alleged denial of equal protection by ostensibly private action is
a clash of competing constitutional claims of a high order: liberty and equality.
Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and
dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even
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same fashion in the New Yo1·k Times case, competing personal reputational and free speech claims were subjected to judicial evaluation
with reference to the Alabama libel rule.
In the very same sense, every fourteenth amendment decisionno matter how orthodox-considers and affects private interests,
private conduct, and prerogatives of making efficacious private deunjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to a large measure of
protection from governmental interference. This liberty would be overridden,
in the name of equality, if the strictures of the Amendment were applied to
governmental and private action without distinction. Id. at 249·50. (Emphasis
added in part.)
As a general proposition, Mr. Justice Harlan's eloquent statement presents a highly
relevant and valuable consideration in the proper analysis of fourteenth amendment
cases. Along with Professor Karst, I have attempted to respect it. See Van Alstyne &:
Karst, supra note 34, at 8, 14-22, 34·36, 41-44, 46·47. The portion of the opinion
italicized above, however, is somewhat misleading.
As a purely practical matter, whether anyone has a meaningful "right" to act
capriciously in the context of a conflict, i.e., when the necessary effect of that act is to
displace conflicting acts proposed by others, may not depend entirely upon his freedom
from governmental interference. Rather, it may depend wholly upon the willingness
of local government to interfere to protect that act.
(F]or legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought
to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it-just as we talk of the
force of gravitation accounting for the conduct of bodies in space. One phrase
adds no more than the other to what we know without it. HoLMES, CoLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 313 (1920).
(O]nly those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back o£
them.... United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945)
(Mr. Justice Jackson).
See also Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 MicH. L. REv. 1, 7, 15
(1913); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
Barring a condition of social anarchy in which "rights" are effectively determined
by the comparative brute strength of antagonistic parties, the establishment or dis·
establishment of a private claim of right is therefore a function of government "interference." Necessarily, a state "should be held responsible" (in the words of Mr.
Justice Harlan) whether it employs its power to interfere against the claim of right
to equality by defending the claim to liberty, or whether it employs its power to
interfere against the claim of right to liberty by defending the claim to equality.
The question remains which, if either, "interference" deprives persons of liberty
without due process or denies persons the equal protection of the laws? Whose con·
duct, if that of either party, is entitled to protection under the fourteenth amend·
ment? Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion may imply that it is the liberty o£ the property
owner which is constitutionally entitled to protection. Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion
in Bell, on the other hand, holds that it is the competing claim of equality which is
constitutionally entitled to protection.
It is entirely possible, however, that in many contexts where liberty and equality
clash, neither claim is automatically established by the fourteenth amendment, because
(again, in Mr. Justice Harlan's words) not all claims of liberty or equality are "consti·
tutional claims of a high order," or in fact constitutional claims at all. Precisely these
conflicts may be reserved for state resolution alone. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, IIO U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
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cisions. For instance, if the Court invalidates a state rate regulation
which pegs railway tariffs at a level lower than that which the Court
determines to be consistent with substantive due process, the effect
is necessarily one of vindicating certain economic interests of railways at the expense of the economic interests of shippers and others
who have benefited from the restriction on the carriers' prerogative to
bargain for higher rates. Although it is the state's law which is invalidated, the Court's ·decision necessarily constitutes a Supreme
Court evaluation and rearrangement of competing private interests
and conduct and the permissible latitude of private decisions which
were formerly dependent on that law for their status as "rights" or
"privileges." The essential point remains: those interests-those
claimed prerogatives-have no constitutional claim to status as operative rights or privileges if they were established by the state in
accordance with a policy which is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary.48 The same reasoning applies in Bell. If we object to the
power of the Supreme Court to make these determinations, then our
objection is really directed toward Cohens v. Virginia44 and every
other case which has reaffirmed the authority of the Court to invalidate state laws which it finds incompatible with its notions of constitutional standards. It cannot be contended, however, ·that no reviewable state action was involved with respect to the law which was
invalidated.

IV
This article is in part a restatement and elaboration of a highly
original article written by Professor Harold Horowitz in 1957.45
In that article, Professor Horowitz effectively discarded the disingenuous dicta in Shelley and drew recognition from the case that
the fourteenth amendment is involved not only when an individual
asserts a claim of right against a state, but also when he asserts a
claim of right against the claims of right of other persons and the
state resolves the conflict according to its policy of what is reasonable
•• The Court's evaluation of the state policy in question necessarily involves a
weighing and balancing of competing interests, not altogether different from the task
originally performed by the legislature which formulated and implemented the policy.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TilE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-14 (1921); BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGERous BRANCH 34-72 (1962); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation,
1960 SuP. CT. REv. 75.
•• 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
•• Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957).
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under the circumstances, i.e., according to its law. The legitimacy of
the state's policy, and the legitimacy of applying that policy in the
manner provided for to the dispute at hand, are, as Professor Horo·
witz said then, fully reviewable to determine whether they square
with standards of due process and equal protection. The issue of
"state action" for purposes of reviewability having been thus estab·
lished, it is the duty of the Court to devote its attention to the sole
remaining issue, viz., "whether the particular state action in the
particular circumstances, determining legal relations between pri·
vate persons, is constitutional when tested against the various federal
constitutional restrictions on state action." 41l
This approach seems to be an entirely sensible formulation, and
happily a number of commentators have attempted to review the
acceptability of particular state action under particular circumstances
accordingly.47 Occasionally, however, the approach has been partly
obscured by characterizations which may be misleading. Thus, the
critical question to be considered by the Supreme Court under this
approach has been formulated in these terms:
In the given situation, is this the kind of state action that violate~
the amendment?4B
(T]he inquiry is not whether state action is present but whether
the state action denies equal protection.49
In fact, however, the question intended to be raised under the due
process and equal protection clauses is not whether this "is the kind
of state action that violates the amendment,"ilo for that unduly
emphasizes the mechanics of manifested state power. It is, rather,
whether the state's value judgments which are represented by and
put into effect through its operative laws are permissible judgments
within the limitations of due process and equal protection. For
example, was it permissible in the Swing case for Illinois to prefer
certain employer prerogatives to be free of picketing over union pre·
rogatives to picket? Was it permissible in Shelley for Missouri to
prefer the interests of adjoining white home owners over the interests
46 I d. at 209.
"See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 42; Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of
Racial Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1964); Williams, supra
note 34.
•• Allen, Critique of "Racial Discrimination in ·Private' Housing," 52 CALIF L. REv.
46, 47 (1964).
40 LocKHART. KAMISAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1314 (1964).
6° Allen. mpra note 48.
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of prospective Negro purchasers? Was it permissible in Cutter Labs.
for California to prefer the employer's "right" to fire over the employee's "right" to work? In each case it was the policy preference
of the state, made operative by its laws, which was under consideration. It was, of course, the operation of those laws which created
the occasion for Supreme Court review of the state policies, but
that did not necessitate focusing on the kind of state action, or on
the state action involved in each case, to the neglect of evaluating the
competing claims of right which reflected upon the constitutional
rationality of the state law in question.
A further distinction should also be observed. State action
manifest in the ordinary application of a state law, which makes
every dispute resolved by state law reviewable according to due process and equal protection standards, is not to be confused with
collateral ties which a state may have with one of the parties-ties
which may have their own distinct bearing on the rationality of the
law as applied in the case. Such collateral ties, e.g.~ subsidies, leases
and delegations of governmental functions, may alter the outcome of
a given case on the merits, since their presence may serve to indicate
clearly the arbitrariness of a state's policy which prefers some claims
of right at the expense of others. The absence of any such collateral
connections, however, does not automatically insulate the state's
policy ~rom constitutional review, nor does it necessarily establish.
that the state's policy is sufficiently fair to survive the demands of
due process and equal protection.51 Thus, a state's policy made
operative through its law may still lack constitutional support even
though the state has no collateral tie with either private party, as
was the case in Swing, Shelley~ Cutter Labs.~ and Bell.
In Shelley, for example, the Supreme Court held that Missouri's
policy, operating through its law of enforceable covenants, rested on
01 As was true in Swing, Shelley and Bell.
See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
"[T)here are some modern fourteenth amendment decisions that can be explained
honestly only by reference to the premise that situations exist in which the states are
under constitutional compulsion to prevent discrimination by private persons or
groups." Allen, supra note 48.
"Another conclusion which must be accepted from the lines of development •.. is
that as a means of determining whether individual constitutional liberties have been
violated, the concept of state action has substantially lost its utility." Williams, suprll
note 34, at 367.
"The real challenge then is to articulate the standards that must be met by state
law authorizing private discriminatory action ... " Traynor, supra note 34, at 238.
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an arbitrary preference of covenantee interests over those of prospective Negro purchasers and faithless covenantors. This was so
despite the fact that the covenantee in that case had received no
special benefit from the state, other than through his membership in
a class of covenant holders whose interests were preferred by the state
law in question. Had the covenantee been the recipient of additional benefits, for instance, had he purchased his house from a government agency which bound itself to repurchase the house at any
time for the original price, such benefits would have made it even
clearer that the state's law rested on an arbitrary classification of
interests under the circumstances. This would have been the case
not because of any significant change in the covenantee's status as a
private citizen, or because the Court would have fictitiously imputed
his decision to bar Negro neighbors to the state, but solely because
the policy of the state in preferring his claim of right over the claims
of right of the faithless covenantor and the prospective Negro
purchaser would have been even less reasonable than it was under
circumstances where the covenantee was not protected against economic loss. In short, the fact that the covenantee would have been
protected against economic loss would have made it even less defensible for the state to disable Negro purchasers through the application
of its law of enforceable covenants.
Note, however, that the possibility of collateral ties between the
covenantee and the state had no bearing upon whether the Missouri
law of covenants was reviewable under the fourteenth amendment.
That reviewability was established by the fact that a law of Missouri
was employed by Missouri to reject a claim of right that a Negro is
free to purchase a house from a willing seller, without regard to the
racial bias of adjoining neighbors. The question then became
whether Missouri's rejection of that claim was arbitrary. Collateral
ties between the covenantees and the state would merely have helped
to make it clearer that that rejection was arbitrary. The absence of
such ties, however, did not make the case unreviewable and was not
sufficient to alter the balance when the Supreme Court assessed the
constitutional rationality of the Missouri law of enforceable covenants as applied. Thus, a collateral state connection with a private
litigant has no magical quality, it serves no special constitutional
function, and it raises no distinct problem. Such a connection
merely presents one additional fact which contributes to an effective
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weighing and balancing of interests within the permitted latitudes
of due process and equal protection. Dicta to the contrary probably
proceed from semantic confusion and vague yearnings to simplify
matters of constitutional analysis, and those cases which purport to
have been decided exclusively on the strength of such collateral
factors have been justifiably criticized as cases which yield no neutral
principles. r; 2

v
"State action" traditionally has been assigned a quadripartite
significance. It has, in practice, meant each of the following:
(a) Action which is reviewable under the fourteenth amendment and
which, upon being reviewed, is found to reflect policies consonant
with due process and equal protection as applied in a given case;
(b) Action which is reviewable under the fourteenth amendment and
which, upon being reviewed, is found to reflect policies not consonant
with due process or equal protection as applied in a given case;
(c) Action which is reviewable under the fourteenth amendment, but
with respect to which consideration is deferred because of a selfimposed judicial policy applicable in certain kinds of cases;53 and
(d) Action which is wholly unreviewable under the fourteenth amendment for purposes of determining whether it reflects policies consonant with due process and equal protection as applied in a given
case.
The burden of this brief aTticle has been to reiterate that this
fourth categorization is inappropriate under the fourteenth amendment. Its adventitious development in constitutional theory is
thoroughly regrettable, and its continued use as an analytic construct
is subject to the following objections:
First, it is essentially a self-contradictory invention, the use of
which is unredeemed by the myriad of ad hoc "state action" rulettes
establishing reviewability on a crazy-quilt basis.
•• See Wechsler, supra note 34, at 19, 26-35. For further illustrations of unwarranted emphasis by the Court on collateral factors, see Griffin v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 130 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963); In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
•• The Court has ample means of avoiding unwelcome cases without resort to the
fiction of "no-reYiewable state action," which operates to restrict its authority and not
merely to attest to its discretion. See, e.g., BICKEL. op. cit. supra note 43, at 111-98.
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Second, it has prevented the Supreme Court from proceeding to
examine due process and equal protection issues on the merits in
cases where such an examination should have been made. In short,
its use has sometimes resulted in a knowing or unknowing abdication of the Court's clear responsibility of constitutional review.
Third, it has prevented the Court from adequately distinguishing
between categories (a) and (b), i.e.~ it has corrupted analyses directed
to the merits and demerits of due process and equal protection
claims. For instance, it has led some justices virtually to assume
that the collateral ties between a state and a private litigant which
they feel must be relied upon merely to render a case reviewable
automatically establish that a violation of due process or equal
protection has occurred. Cases in which this occurs are thus fought
out on the threshold of reviewability, frequently without a sufficient
examination of the particular arrangement of the conflicting interests
or of the manner in which those interests were mediated by the state
in question. On the other hand, it has led other justices to disregard
the merits in some cases on the presumption that the merits cannot
be reached at all unless certain collateral ties exist between the state
and one of the parties to the action. Neither view regarding collat·
eral ties is proper, but perpetuation of the "no-reviewable state
action" category has made each inevitable to a certain extent.
Abandonment of the mythological "no-reviewable state action"
category will not, as some allege, necessarily increase the Court's
eventual caseload or make the law of the fourteenth amendment
hopelessly uncertain or unpredictable. The Court will certainly
continue to reject appeals and to deny petitions for certiorari for
want of a substantial federal question whenever it is clear that the
policy of the state~ manifest in the law under consideration~ does not
offend due process or deny equal protection~ as applied. For example, had the Court considered Cutter Labs. on the merits, it might
have concluded that the policy of the California law of contracts did
reflect a constitutionally reasonable apportionment of rights and
duties, and that the enforceable preference for an employer's freedom of action as originally accepted by the union was not an arbitrary state resolution of the conflicting employer-employee interests
under the circumstances. Having so decided, the Court would have
avoided consideration of "like" cases in the short run. Knowledge·
able attorneys, correspondingly, would have refrained from pressing
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"like" cases for review. Similarly, if the Court had found the California policy arbitrary as applied, that would have established a
precedent of comparable utility. Whether subsequent cases are
"like" cases, of course, depends upon the breadth of the holding
and rationale in the case which operates in a stare decisis fashion.
The Court would also be justified in refusing to review such cases
as those in which a state has upheld a home owner's interests in
property, privacy, and freedom of association by sustaining the
trespass conviction of an officious, uninvited guest, not because such
a case would be unreviewable, but simply because any equal protection claim advanced by the trespasser would be so obviously insubstantial that review would be unwarranted.
The difference in approach, therefore, need not occasion any
long run surfeit of cases,54 and it most assuredly does not introduce
any uncertainty into the law which is avoided by the traditional
approach. Indeed, the ad hoc exceptions to the "no·reviewable state
action" doctrine are themselves so numerous and unruly that no one
can confidently predict what the Court may or may not do in a given
case.
On the other hand, several distinct advantages are offered by the
approach endorsed here, which begins by eliminating the category
of "no-reviewable state action." First, it discards a cumbersome and
misleading fiction and reiterates an obvious proposition, viz., the
fourteenth amendment by its very terms brings the fairness of every
state policy, manifest in a state law resolving conflicting claims of
right, within the Court's legitimate discretion to determine whether
that policy, as applied in a given case, offends constitutional norms of
due process or equal protection. Second, it avoids the false assumption that state action sufficient to bring a case within the range of
constitutional review is also sufficient to establish a violation of constitutional norms of due process or equal protection. Third, it
avoids the equally false assumption that extraordinary state action,
i.e., collateral connections, is a prerequisite of review under the fourteenth amendment, and it encourages the Court to consider collateral
state action only as it affects the character of the interests actually
involved in a given dispute.
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